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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Regulation of Commerce.-The term "commerce," as employed in
section 8, Art. I. of the Constitution of the United States, is not limited
to an exchange of commodities only, but includes, as well, "intercourse"
with foreign nations, and between the states;' and the term "intercourse" includes the transportation of passengers: People v. Raymond,
34 Cal.
When the Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional
right, has by
its legislation established regulations of commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, its authority is paramount and exclusive,
and its enactments supersede all state legislation on those subjects.
Whether the states could constitutionally exercise this power in the
absence of congressional legislation, not decided: Id.
In the case where the state has not the constitutional power, by means
of direct legislation, to regulate the intercourse of its citizens with
foreign nations, and with the other states, it cannot accomplish by indirect methods what it is forbidden to do directly: Id.
By the enactment of section 285 of the United States Internal Revenue Act, 2 Bright. Dig. 271, the Act of August 30th 1852, and the Act
of March 6th 1855, 10 U. S. Stat. at Large 61, 715, Congress has under.
taken to regulate the entire business of transporting passengers by sea:
Id.
The act entitled "An act to provide revenue for the support of the
government of this state from a tax' upon foreign and inland bills, passengers, insurance companies, and other matters," passed May 14th
1862, has no reference to the execution of the inspection laws of this
state, and is not in the nature of a police regulation, but is a measure
designed for revenue purposes only: Id.
The stamps which, by the provisions of the act, are required to be
purchased from the state, are -to be regarded in no other light than as a
tax on the contract for passage, to be paid by the passenger. This is a
regulation of commerce within the meaning of section 8, Art. I. of the
Federal Constitution, and the act is unconstitutional and void: .Td.
Certificate of Election to ex officio Office.-It is not essential to the
right of entry on the discharge of the duties of an ex officio office, that
the incumbent should receive a separate certificate of election thereto,
or take therefor a separate oath of office, when not specially so required
by the act creating or regulating such office: People v. Kelsey, 84

Cal.
Power of Legislature.-The legislature has the constitutional power
IFrom J. E. Hale, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 34 Cal. Rep.
2 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 4 of his Reports.
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by enactment to divest an officer of an ex officio office to which be had
been elected and duly qualified, by a repeal of the law under which he
became invested therewith, provided, where such office be created under
the Constitution, such repeal does not in effect abolish such office: Id.
In such case, however, this power does not extend to the transfer of
an ex officio office which, under the Constitution, is required to be filled
by election, to the incumbent of another office who has not been elected
to such ex officib office: Id.
The clause, to wit: "Assessors and collectors of town, county, and
state taxes shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district,
county, or town in which the property taxed for state, county, or town
purposes is situated," contained in section 13 of Art. XI. of the Constitution, is imperative and mandatory, and restricts the power of the
legislature to a particular mode of providing such assessors and collectors
in the first instance, subject to such mode of filling vacancies which
may be occasioned by the death, resignation, or other legal disability of
the incumbent as the Constitution has, and statute law may, provide:
Id.
The legislature may by law'devolve the office and duties of tax collector upon the incumbent of any other elective office, but such law must
precede the election of such officer, and his election must be by the
qualified electors of the tax collector's district: Id.
The -act entitled "1An act making the county treasurer of San Joaquin
county ex officio tax collector," passed April 2d 1866, was not designed
to fill a vacancy in the office of tax collector, but it was to make the
treasurer, instead of the sheriff, of San Joaquin county tax collector.
In so far as the act provides for the transfer of said office to take place
before an election of such treasurer occurs, it is unconstitutional and
void : Id.
CONTRACT. See Railroad.
SPecific Performance-Laches.-A delay of fifteen years in calling
for the specific performance of a parol contract for the conveyance of
land, without any attmpt to enforce it in the lifetime of the contractor,
is a circumstance of great weight against the party seeking performance, and will render necessary more strict and fuller proof, and a closer
scrutiny of the evidence: 4 1 re v. Eyre and Others, 4 C. E. Green.
Part performance will take a contract out of the Statute of Frauds.
when it has been in part performed in such manner that a refusal would
be a fraud on the other party. But for this purpose the contract itself
must be clearly proved, and the acts of part performance must be referable to the contract alone: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Fraudulent Uonveance.-A conveyance made in consideration of the
grantee's assuming the mortgages upon the property, amounting to onefourth of its value, declared voluntary and void as against the creditors
of the grantor, as to three-fourths of the value; but being positively
intended also to delay and defraud creditors, it was declared void in toto,
and the purchaser (at a sheriff's sale of the property) entitled to hold
the same free from all claim of the grantee except for the amount due
on such mortgages held or paid by him and the interest thercon, the
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rents and profits to be set off against so much of those debts as are due
to the grantee: Xead v. Combs, 4 0. E. Green.
Mortgage fraudulentas to Creditor.-Ajudgment-creditor purchasing
at sheriff's sale, under his judgment, is entitled to have a mortgage upon
the property, given by the defendant in execution in embarrassed circumstances, set aside and declared void as against such purchaser on the
ground that it was given to delay and defraud creditors, and without
consideration: King v. Storeg and Others, 4*C. E. Green.
.Bill to set aside Conveyance in fraud of Creditor.-A creditor cannot file a bill to set aside a transfer of property fraudulently made by his
debtor, until he has a judgment or execution, such as would give a lien
on that property if not transferred: Green v. Tantumn, 4 C. E. Green.
At common law, a judgment or execution gave no lien upon the choses
in'action of the debtor or debts to him. But by the Act of larch 7th
1850, to prevent fraudulent trusts and assignments, and the supplements
to the Chancery Act, a creditor upon the return of an execution nulla
bona, has a lien upon the choses in action of his debtor, and can maintain a suit to set aside a fraudulent assignment: Id.
Although a purchaser of property transferred by a debtor to defraud
his creditors, pay full consideration and have no notice that the property
is transferred to him for that purpose, yet if the circumstances are such
from which he must have inferred that such was the object, the sale will
be set aside as against a creditor : Id.
DBED.

Variation bygparolagreements.-Where a deed expresses a consideration, though merely nominal and never paid, no use results to the
grantor, and parol proof that the conveyance was intended to be in trust
for the grantor will not raise a trust: Hogan v. J7aques and Others, 4 0.
E. Green.
A trust estate cannot be sold by execution: Id.
That a deed absolute on its face was really given as security for a debt
and intended only as a mortgage, may be shown by parol proof, but the
proof must be very plain where the debt does not remain, or is considered as paid by giving the deed: Id.
A. verbal promise by the grantee to the grantor that he would reconvey the land upon receiving back the amount of his debt will not be
enforced; much less against a purchaser for valuable consideration,
without notice: Id.
EJEOTMENT.

Writ of Restitution.-A party and her tenants, coming into possession
of lands, after an action brought to recover possession, under a prior unrecorded deed from two of the defendants in the action, of which plain.
tiff had no notice when the action was commenced, were properly disposissued on a judgment for plaintiff in
sessed under a writ of restitution,
34 Cal.
said action: M ayne v. Jones,
A motion made to set aside the return to the writ, showing the dispossession of said party and her tenants, and to reinstate them in possession, upon a showing of said facts, under the peculiar circumstances
of the case disclosed by the record, was properly denied by the court
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below. (Leese v. Clark, 29 Cal. 672, cited as authority, and error in
report of that case corrected) : Id.
Where a defendant, duly served in an action brought to recover possession of lands, was in possession of a portion of the demanded premises as guardian of an infant who held an unrecorded conveyance
thereof, of which plaintiff had no notice when the action was commenced :
held, that such defendant, and the infant and her tenants, who entered
subsequent to the commencement of the action, were properly dispossessed under a writ of restitution issued on a judgment for plaintiff in
said action: Id.
EQUITY.
Practiee.-A complainant cannot dismiss his own bill as to part of the
relief prayed, and proceed with the residue; he must apply to amend:
The Camden and Amboy Railroad Co. v. Stewart, 4 0. E. Green.
Party's own Fraud.-A court of equity will not relieve against a,
conveyance made to prevent the grantor's property from being sacrificed
and his creditors from recovering their money. And no subsequent
promise for the reconveyance of such property, founded on such fraudulent consideration, will be enforced: E 're v. Eyre and Others, 4 0. E.
Green.
Parties to Bill.-Where the answer of one of several defendants
objects to a bill for want of proper parties, and the controversy as to
that defendant is settled before the final hearing, the objection will be
disregarded: Booraem. v. Fels, 4 0. E. Green.
In a suit to set aside a conveyance to a trustee to hold in trust for one
person for her life, and at her death to such of her children as she may
appoint, such children as the cestui que trust may have are not necessary
parties; their interest is too uncertain and contingent: Id.
EXECUTOR.

See M71.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

See Contract.

HIGHWAY.

Surveyjor's .Returnm-Encroach~nntson.-A return of surveyors of the
highways coming up collaterally in this court, cannot be judged void or
disregarded for any irregularity or deficiency, if the surveyors had jurisdiction of the subject-matter: Tainter v. .orristown, 4 0. E. Green.
It is not necessary that a commission be appointed to ascertain the
lines of an ancient highway before proceeding to remove encroachments
alleged to be thereon, when the true limits and courses thereof can be
ascertained with accuracy and certainty, and in fact are so ascertained
by survey: Id.
Time will not legalize an encroachment upon a public highway: Id.
The Act of March 24th 1859 (Nix. Dig. 751), applies not to ancient
highways, but to roads not opened, used or worked within twenty years
after being laid out: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Action by.-Where, pending a suit by a husband and wife for the
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specific performance of an agreement to convey real estate to the wife,
the wife dies, and her children have not been made complainants, and
there is no order that the suit should proceed in the name of the surviving complainant, no decree can be made: Hand v. Jacobus and Wife,
4 C. E. Green.
Divorce-Evdence.--Divorce,on the ground of adultery, will not be
decreed upon the testimony of a particeps criminis, herself notoriously
unchaste, and in her evidence untruthful and reckless, uncorroborated
by any circumstances that lead to the conviction of the defendant's
guilt: Clare v. Clare, 4 C. E. Green.
The proof of' adultery, to justify a decree of divorce, must not only
be clear and direct, but it must be -entitled to and command belief: Id.
INFANT.

See Tenant for Site.

INJUNCTION.
Dissolution of.-An injunction will be dissolved upon the answer only
when it.denies explicitly the facts upon which the equity of the bill is
founded; it is not sufficient that it denies the inference to be drawn
from those facts or their effect: Teasey v. Baker, 4 C. E. Green.
JUDGMENT.

Collaterally attacked for want of ,Jurisdiction.-Thejudgment of a
court of superior jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked upon the
ground that the court by which it was rendered had no jurisdiction,
either of the subject-matter or of the person of the defendant, or both:
Hahn v.Kelly and Norse, 34 Cal.
Such facts or circumstances only can be shown or relied on, in support of such attack, as affirmatively appear on the face of the record, or
what, under the law as it read at the date of the judgment, constituted
the judgment-roll: Id.
Ver4ty of Record or Judgment-1-ol.-The judgment-roll, as prescribed
by the Civil Practice Act, constitutes the record of a court of superior
jurisdiction, and, because it imports absolute verity, it cannot be collaterally attacked by proof aliunde: Id.
It is not essential that the jurisdiction of a superior court should
affirmatively appear in the judgmeit-roll; if it does not, and the contrary does not therein affirmatively appear, jurisdiction will be conclusively presumed: Id.
Inspection of the Record.-The rule by which inspection of the record
is governed is, that legal presumptions do not come to the aid of the
record, except as to acts or facts touching which the record is silent. In
such case, it will be presumed that what ought to have been done was
not only done, but rightly done; but where the record states what was
done, it will not be presumed that something different was done. A want
of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the record, when
whatever was done is stated, and which, having been done, was not sufficient in law to give the court jurisdiction: Id.
Another rule is, that the whole record must be permitted to speak, as
where that portion which is denominated the proof of service, is not
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silent, but recites facts and acts done, as constituting the service made,
and which, if the record were otherwise silent, would make it affirmatively show a want of jurisdiction of the person of defendant, yet if, in
another part, as the judgment, further facts or acts, not irreconcilable
with the former, be recited, which establish such jurisdiction, it is sufficient to uphold the judgment: Id.
Where the judgment recites the fact that the defendant has been duly
served with process, it is a direct adjudication by the court upon the
point, and is as conclusive on the parties as any other fact decided in
the cause, provided it does not affirmatively appear from other portions
of the record, consisting of the judgment-roll, that the recital is untrue : Id.
Legal Presumptions as to Jurisdictim of Courts.-The rule is, that
the presumptions of law are in favor of the jurisdiction and of the regularity of the proceedings of courts of superior or general jurisdiction,
which, in this state, comprise all courts of record, and this rule obtains
equally, whether their proceedings be by the course of the common law
or statute law, or be in the acquisition of jurisdiction of the person of
defendant, by making either actual or constructive service of the summons on him; but that no such presumptions are indulged in favor of
the jurisdiction or regularity of the proceedings of courts and tribunals
of inferior or limited jurisdiction, which, in this state, comprise all courts
not of-record, and all special boards and tribunals which are created by
law and clothed with judicial functions of a limited and special character; and all persons who claim any right or benefit under their judgId.
ments must show their jurisdiction affirmatively-LEGACY.

See Wt.

LIMTATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Hi.h a/.

Right of Redemption, when Barred.-The right of the mortgagee to
maintain an action on the debt, and to enforce the lien of the mortgage
given to secure it, and the right of the mortgagor to maintain an action
for the redemption of the property from the lien of the mortgage, are
reciprocal; and when one is barred by the Statute of Limitations the
other is also barred: Arrington v. LIscom et aL., 34 Cal.
TitIe Under.-An adverse possession of land for the period of time
prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, not only bars the remedy, but
practically extinguishes the right of the party having the true paper
title, and vests a perfect title in the adverse holder: Id.
As a Source of Title to Lands.-A party who has been in the exclusive adverse possession of lands for a period of time which, under the
Statute of Limitations, vests him with a title thereto, may maintain an
action against a party claiming under a record title, to have said adverse
claim determined and adjudged null and void as against him: Id.
"Title to land is the means whereby the owner of lands has the just
possession of his property." A party, under the Statute of Limitations,
may acquire an absolute right of possession in lands as against all the
world; such a right as, when ousted, will restore him to and effectually
protect him in his just possession thereof, even against one having the
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*written title.- An adverse possession, therefore, confers a substantial
title, and it is such a title as entitles the holder to all the remedies
to quiet his possession that are incident to possessions under written
titles : Id.
Action to remove Cloud upon Title.-An apparently good record title
to land constitutes a cloud upon a title thereto which has been subsequently acquired by adverse possession under the Statute of Limitations,
which the holder by adverse possession is entitled to have removed.
This statute would have performed but half its mission as a statute of
repose, if the party relying upon it, as to a party claiming under a written title, must wait till he is attacked before he can reduce the evidence
of his title, which otherwise rests only in parol, to the form of a nermanent record: Id.
See Limitations.
MORTGAGE.
Of Clhattels.-Underthe Act, concerning chattel mortgages, of 'March
24th 1864, Pamph. L. 493, a mortgage upon chattels situate in a different county from that in which the mortgagor resides, and recorded only
in the county where the chattels are situate at the time of the execution
of the mortgage, is entitled to priority in payment over another mortgage, of a prior date, but of which the subsequent mortgagees had no
notice, and recorded subsequently, though recorded in the county where
the chattels lay, and also in that where the mortgagor resided at the
time of its execution : De Cource~ and Others v. Little and Others, 4
0. E. Green.
Of Canal-Boat.-By a statute of New York, any mortgage on canalboats, or a copy thereof, is required to be filed in the office of the auditor
of the canal department, and within thirty days next preceding a year
from the filing thereof, a copy is required to be again filed, or the mortgage shall be void as against the creditors of the mortgagor or subsequent
purchasers or mortgagees in good faith:
Held, upon a bill to foreclose such a mortgage, the second copy
whereof was not filed till after the year had elapsed, that the mortgage
was valid as against attachments sued out in this state, after the actual
filing of such second copy, for wages accrued since such filing, but must
be postponed to such wages as accrued before the refiling, as well before
as after the default: Herrick v. King and Others, 4 C. E. Green.
For Collateral Security.-If a mortgagee who holds a mortgage for
$10,000 as collateral security for a note of the mortgagor for that
amount, at the request of the mortgagor assigns the mortgage to a third
person for $7500 in cash, credits this sum on the note, and retains the
note, and the balance of $2500 is paid by the mortgagor, such mortgage
in the hands of the assignee is a valid security for $7500 only as against
subsequent encumbrancers at the time of the assignment. That is the
only part of the debt for which it was given that remains unpaid: Boy
v. BramhaU, 4 0: E. Green.
A conveyance of part of mortgaged premises "1subject to the payment
of all liens now on the same," does not create a personal obligation on
the vendor to pay the mortgage or any part of it; but it makes the part
so conveyed as against the residue subject to its proper proportion of the
mortgage-debt, and to that only: Rd.
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A mortgagee who holds a mortgage on two parcels, one of which is
subject to a second encumbrance, will be compelled first to exhaust the
security on which the second encumbrancer has no lien, or to subrogate
the second encumbrancer to his claim on the parcel mortgaged only to
him: Id.
Former Recovery on Bond for .partof the Amount.-A suit brought

in New York upon a bond by a person to whom it was assigned as collateral security for a less amount, in which only the amount for which
it was assigned as collateral security was recovered, and to which the
obligee was no party, does not satisfy and extinguish the bond as against
the obligee. And in a suit brought by the absolute assignee of the
bond and mortgage subsequent to such collateral assignment, he will be
-entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage for the residue due upon it,
beyond the amount recovered: Brumagin v. Chew, 4 0. E. Green.
The effect of such recovery will be determined by the law of the state
of New York. And the well-.established rule that the proceedings in
any suit will not affect any one but a party to it, will be assumed to be
the law of New York, until it is shown that a different rule is established

there : Id.
Default of Payment of Interest.-An agreement by an assignee of a

bond and mortgage that he would call at the office of the obligor for
the interest, does not make that office ever after the only legal place for
payment, and is not in form or legal effect an agreement so as to affect
the bond: Me Cotter v. De Groot, 4 0. E. Green.
But when, in consequence of such agreement, the obligor failed to
pay his interest within the thirty days limited by the condition of the
bond, equity will relieve him from the forfeiture of his condition by
such neglect: Id.
A demand by the assignee after the thirty days had elapsed, although
he had not called as promised, for the payment-of the principal, and a
refusal to accept the interest, is notice that he did not mean to be bound
by his promise. And where the obligor subsequently offered to pay
that interest, and the interest about to become due, but made no tender
of the latter interest within the thirty days after it became due, the
complainant was held to be entitled to the principal: Id.
PARTITION. See Tenant in Common.
Proceedings and Return of Commissioners.-Exceptions will not lie

to the return of commissioners in a suit for partition (on the ground of
inequality of value in the lots). The correct practice in such case is
by. motion to suppress the return: Hay v. Estell and Others, 4 0. E.
Green.
The court will set aside and quash the return of commissioners of
partition when the partition has been made upon wrong principles, or in
disregard of the rights of the parties, or where there is great and evident inequality in the division. But to set aside a partition for mere
inequality, when there is no partiality or improper conduct of the commissioners, the proof must be clear, and the inequality considerable: Id.
The theory that commissioners in partition are, like arbitrators, judges
voluntarily chosen by the parties to decide between them, and therefore'
they are concluded by their judgment, whether right or wrong, if not
given corruptly or through favor, dissented from: Id.
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The question to be considered by the court, on motion to quash the
partition, is, whether the inequality is more than can be fairly accounted
for by the difference in judgment between men of discretion in valuing
the property: Id.
PUBLIc ADMINISTRATOR.

Autaiority/ to administer on a particular Estate.-The public administrator of the city and county of San Francisco can take upon
himself the duties of an administrator of a given estate only by virtue
of a special grant from the Probate Court, made upon a petition therefor filed in the matter of such estate. He does not, by virtue of his
office, acquire th4 right to administer upon any particular estate: In tlh,
Matter of tle Estate of Hamilton, 84 Cal.
While one administrator of an estate is in office, there is no power in
the probate judge or court to appoint a new one: Id.
The order for the appointment, as provided in section 62 of the Probate Act, the qualification of the appointee, and the issuing of letters
to him thereon, are all necessary proceedings to invest such appointee
with the. office of administrator of an estate. The appointment is in
fieri until the appointee has qualified and received his letters : Id.
Under our statute, an administrator can only establish his official
character, when denied, by the production of his letters with the oath
of office annexed, or of a certified copy of the record thereof, made
according to the requirements of section 72 of the Probate Act: Id.
RAILROAD.
Contract between Connecting Roads as to Division of Fares.-In a
contract between companies owning connecting lines of railroad, for the
continuous transportation of passengers and freight over both lines, it
is lawful to agree upon a division of the fares, by which one company
allows part of the fares earned on its line to the other company :* ussex Railroad Co. v. Morris and Essex Railroad Co., 4 C. E. Green.
Such contract is valid as to future extensions of the road, even as to
such as may be authorized by future legislation: Id.
A contract made by a railroad company which by its terms includes
any future extension of the road, will include in its operation not only
such as were authorized by law at the making of the contract, but such
as were afterwards authorized by subsequent legislation: Id.
A contract between railroad companies using the same gauge, to
transport passengers and freight continuously over both lines, does not
imply a contract on the part of either company that it will not change
the gauge of its road: Id.
A bill for an account of fares received accordig to a contract previously made between the parties,-'is not technically a bill for specific
performance so as to induce a court of equity to refuse relief on the
ground that the contract is inequitable: Id.
REVERSION.

See Tenantfor Life.

TENANT FOR LIPE.

Waste-Sale of Reversion.-A life tenant is bound to keep the
premises in repair, not excepting dilapidations occasioned by ordinary
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wear and tear in the proper use of the premises: I M-1atter of Sale of
Lands of Afary E. Steele, an Infant, 4 0. E. Green.
The reversionary estate of an infant will not 'be sold because there
may be a great advantage in the sale to the tenant for life, when the
benefit to the infant is doubtful or inappreciable: Id.
TENANT IN COMMON.
Partition between-Parol Promise to Convey.-A verbal agreement
by one co-tenant with another that he will convey to him his interest
in the premises, is no bar to a suit for partition: Polhemus and Wife v.
Hodson and TVife, 4 0. E. Green.
WASTE. See Tenantfor Life.
Iyunction against Cutting down Shade-trees, &c.-The unlawful
cutting down of fences, shade-trees, and ornamental shrubbery, is an
irreparable injury, and, where established, will be suppressed by the
preventive powers of this courf: Tainter v. Tie .M[ay/or of .1lorristown,
4 0. E. Green.
WILL.
Legacy- Chargeableon Real Estate.-Where the real and personal
state of the testator have been blended in one common fund, and the
personalty is insufficient to pay debts, and the words "not herein otherwise disposed of" are added to the residuary clause, legacies will be
charged upon the real estate: Dey v. Dey's Admr., 4 0. E. Green.
In determining whether a legacy is chargeable upon the real estate,
the court will consider the circumstances of the testator, and the nature
and amount of his property: Id.
A legacy to a widow, evidently intended by the testator to be paid to
her, before the proceeds of his property were invested (in accordapce
with the directions of the will) for her use, will not be abated in case
of a deficiency, in favor of legacies not payable till two years after the
death of the widow: Id.
Direction to sell land-Power of Executor.-An executor has no
power to sell the lands of his testator, unless directed to do so by the
will, either expressly or by implication: L ppincott's Executor v. Lippincott, 4.0. E. Green.
The appointment of one as executor of a will that directs lands to be
sold, does not, of itself, confer on him the power to sell. But if the
executor is directed by the will, or bound by law, to see to the application of the proceeds of the sale, or if the proceeds in the disposition
of them are mixed up and blended with the personalty, which it is the
duty of the executor to dispose of and pay over, then a power of sale is
conferred on the executor by implication: Id.
Power of Sale.-If a will direct executors to sell a certain tract after
the death of a certain legatee, and contains no other power of sale, a
sale in the lifetime of such legatee is void: Booraem v. Wells, 4 0. E.
Green.
A direction to rent out the house and lands devised for the use of a
legatee during his life, and to make such other arrangement as the executors might deem expedient for his support on the same, does not by
implication give the executors power to sell: 11.

